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DYING TO SLEEP: USING FEDERAL
LEGISLATION AND TORT LAW TO CURE
THE EFFECTS OF FATIGUE IN MEDICAL
RESIDENCY PROGRAMS
Andrew W. Gefell*
Sawyer: Dr. Nossett, I’m going to start with you. You’ve not only
seen it all, you say you’ve done it. And in fact, you once fell
asleep yourself while delivering a baby?
Nossett: That’s correct.1
INTRODUCTION
The exhausting work schedules of resident physicians in the
United States create an array of grave safety problems for
medical residents and the public at large. In addition to residents’
personal and emotional difficulties and the compromised quality
of health care, the incidence of motor vehicle accidents that occur
after residents leave work is alarming.2
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., Brandeis University, 1997.
The author would like to thank his parents, Paul and Peg Gefell, Johnita,
Johanna, Nora and Mary Jo for their unconditional support and
encouragement.
1
Interview by Diane Sawyer with Dr. Angela Nossett, Chief Resident,
Harbor UCLA Medical Center (ABC television broadcast, June 18, 2002).
2
See Lisa M. Bellini et al., Variation of Mood and Empathy During
Internship, 287 JAMA 3143 (2002) (finding that “enthusiasm at the beginning
of the internship gave way to depression, anger and fatigue”). In addition, a
recent study found that the rate of accidents involving anesthesia residents was
more than twice the national average. See R.T. Gear et al., Incidence of
Automobile Accidents Involving Anesthesia Residents After On-Call Duty
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To combat this crisis and other problems related to resident
work hours, New York created the Bell Regulations, which limit
the number of hours residents may be scheduled.3 In addition, on
November 6, 2001, Congressman John Conyers of Michigan
introduced the Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of
2001 (PPSPA) as an amendment to Title XVII of the Social
Security Act.4 The bill, still far from gaining sufficient support to
Cycles, 87 ANESTHESIOLOGY 938 (1997). Of note is the fact that the research
was limited to accidents occurring after on-call shifts. According to a 1991
mail survey, residents typically work continuously with little or no sleep for an
average of 56.9 total hours twice a week. See Public Citizens Health Research
Group et al., Petition to OSHA (April 30, 2001), available at
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=6771. This number is
above and beyond their other assigned shifts, which can cumulate up to as
many as 136 out of the 168 hours in a week. See L. Lagnado, Hospitals
Overwork Young Doctors in New York, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1998, at B5.
3
10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii) (2002).
These regulations were created in response to uproar from the Libby Zion case
in New York City. See infra, note 29 (discussing the Libby Zion case). The
New York State Health Commissioner put together a panel, led by Dr.
Bertrand Bell, Professor at Albert Einstein College of Medicine, to investigate
conditions in New York’s teaching hospitals. See Leslie K. Kohman, “Beat the
Clock”: Will There be Time in the New Millenium to Train Surgeons and Care
for Patients, CardioThoracic Surgery Network, (June 4, 2002), available at
http://www.ctsnet.org/doc/5821. Hence, the panel became known as the Bell
Commission. Id. In 1989, the recommendations of the commission became
part of the New York State Health Code. Id. See also H.R. 1852, 210th Leg.
(N.J. 2002). On June 20, 2002, the New Jersey Assembly unanimously voted
to pass a bill limiting residents’ work hours. Press Release, Committee of
Interns and Residents, NJ Assembly Passes Bill to Limit Resident Work
Hours, available at www.cirdocs.org/news/217 breakingnewspage.htm (last
visited May 20, 2003); see also H.R. 390 (P.R. 2002).
4
H.R. 3236 IH, 107th Cong. (2001). Amongst its findings, the bill states
that scientific literature demonstrates that the excessive work hours of resident
physicians produce harmful effects on both patient care and the health of
resident physicians. Id. Furthermore, the bill points out that residents work an
“excessive number [ ] of hours,” which is “inherently dangerous for patient
care and the lives of physicians,” that “sleep deprivation of the magnitude
seen in residency training programs leads to cognitive impairment,” and that
scientific research demonstrates that the “excessive hours worked by residentphysicians lead to higher rates of medical error, motor vehicle accidents,
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be passed into law, is based in large part on the New York
regulations.5 Both state regulations and federal legislative action
support the view that employers need to better control the
scheduling of their employees to prevent foreseeable risks to
others.6 If New York serves as a guide, however, regulations
may not be sufficient. The New York regulations have proven to
have limited effectiveness, as hospitals routinely violate work
depression and pregnancy complications.” Id.
5
See 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS, tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii) (2002).
The PPSPA is consistent with the recognition that industries affecting public
safety warrant federal regulation. For example, transportation industries are
subjected to strict federal limits on the number of hours airplane pilots, truck
drivers, train conductors and seamen are permitted to work. 14 C.F.R. §
121.471 (2003) (limiting flight times for all flight crewmembers); 49 C.F.R. §
395.3 (2003) (setting maximum driving times for motor vehicle carriers); 49
C.F.R. §§ 228.21 (2003) (imposing civil penalties for violating hours of
service regulations for railroad employees), 49 C.F.R. § 228.23 (2003)
(imposing criminal penalties for falsifying reports or records of hours of
service for railroad employees); 46 U.S.C. § 8104 (2003) (setting work hour
regulations for seamen). In 1999, the European Union agreed to limit the
length of the work week for residents to forty-eight hours. Paul R. McGinn,
Europe Will Limit Resident Hours, MED. STUDENT JAMA (Sept. 20, 1999),
available at http://www.amaassn.org/scipubs/msjama/articles/vol_282/no_13/
europe.htm; David Villar Patton et al., Legal Considerations of Sleep
Deprivation Among Resident Physcians, 34 J. HEALTH L. 377 (2001). The
authors found that in Israel, a system of longer residency programs with fewer
hours during the residency “substantially enables Israel’s doctors to permit
room for their own human needs, and in turn, provide compassionate and
humane care as a matter of habit.” Id. at 386, citing Jesse Lachter, Looking at
the Training of House Staff, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 718, 719 (1988).
Additionally, they report that New Zealand residents may work up to only
sixteen hours consecutively, with a weekly maximum limited to seventy-two
hours. Id. Emergency room residents may work no more than ten consecutive
hours, with up to fifty hours per week. Id. Finally, Denmark, Norway and
Sweden residents work thirty-seven to forty-five hours per week; in the
Netherlands they are limited to forty-eight hours per week. Id. at 387.
6
See Gene P. Bowen, Wherein Lies the Duty? Determining Employer
Liability for the Actions of Fatigued Employees Commuting From Work, 42
WAYNE L. REV. 2091, 2092 (1996) (stating that the “notion behind such
legislation appears to be recognition of an employer’s duty to monitor the
work schedules of its employees to avoid creating a safety hazard to others”).
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hour standards.7
In addition to formal regulations, the deterrent effect of the
tort system might also be utilized to “encourage” hospitals to
adjust residents’ training and employment.8 Specifically, in the
realm of third-party liability, a person struck by a sleep-deprived
resident that has fallen asleep at the wheel on the way home from
work may be able to sue the hospital on a theory of negligence.
Although this specific claim has never been successfully tried,
analogous case law and public policy suggest such a claim is
legally sound and could, if triumphant, improve resident training
methods and working conditions in the United States. But,
ultimately, the question remains whether that is the best
alternative.
Part I of this note reviews the ever-expanding landscape of
scientific evidence on fatigue and its effect on human capabilities,
patient care and the lives of residents. Part II introduces the
elements of the New York statute, evaluates its effectiveness and
briefly examines the proposed federal legislation. Part III
explores whether utilizing the deterrent force of the tort system is
a wise alternative or supplement to regulatory attempts to change
residency working conditions. While acknowledging that the
majority of courts reject imposing third-party liability on the
employer, this section focuses on three analogous cases that
support liability under certain circumstances. Furthermore, Part
III utilizes workers’ compensation cases in a similar fashion. Part
IV synthesizes direct negligence and workers’ compensation case
law and argues that, within these cases, principles emerge that
support a finding of negligence in the resident-employee context.
7

See, e.g., New York State Department of Health, State Health
Department Cites 54 Teaching Hospitals for Resident Working Hour Violations
(June 26, 2002), [hereinafter Health Department Cites 54 Teaching Hospitals]
available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/commish/2002/resident_
working_hours.htm.
8
See Boston Medical Center, et al., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999) (holding
that medical residents are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, notwithstanding that they also possess aspects
of students).
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Part V recognizes that third-party tort liability offers compelling
benefits, but concludes that enforced public regulation of resident
work hours proposes far less frightening costs and maintains the
benefits of well-rested physicians.
I. FATIGUE: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT DOES
Two commonly cited consequences of medical resident
fatigue are reduced quality of patient care and a negative impact
on the health of residents.9 In addition, motor vehicle crashes,
particularly after on-duty shifts, have also garnered attention in
discussion of residents’ work hours.10 To understand the reasons,
it is important to first understand the nature of fatigue.
Human beings have a biological need to sleep, and sleep
deprivation causes the brain to signal to the body the need to
sleep.11 Sleepiness is a specific term “relating to reduced
alertness as a result of increased pressure to fall asleep.”12
Whether lacking sleep for twenty-four consecutive hours (“sleep
loss”), or receiving inadequate sleep over a period of time

9

Included in Congress’ findings in support of this bill were that residents
work “an excessive number [ ] of hours” that is “inherently dangerous for
patients and the lives of [ ] physicians,” that “sleep deprivation of the
magnitude seen in residency training programs leads to cognitive impairment”
and that scientific research demonstrates that the “excessive hours worked by
resident-physicians lead to higher rates of medical error, motor vehicle
accidents, depression and pregnancy complications.” H.R. 3236, supra note 4,
at § 2.
10
See, e.g., R.T. Gear et al., supra note 2, at 3A; James M. Lyznicki, et
al., Sleepiness, Driving, and Motor Vehicle Crashes, 279 JAMA 23 (1998);
Carole L. Marcus & Gerald M. Loughlin, Effect of Sleep Deprivation on
Driving Safety in Housestaff, 19 SLEEP 763 (1996).
11
See Lyznicki et al., supra note 10, at 1908. “The sleep process
involves a demand or obligatory component related to an individual’s prior
amounts of rest and work, and a circadian component related to 2 intervals of
increased sleepiness and lowered performance are experienced during each 24hour period.” Id.
12
Id. at 1909. “Sleepiness is a normal manifestation of the biological
need for sleep, just as hunger signals the need to eat and thirst to drink.” Id.
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(“chronic partial sleep restriction”), the harmful impact on
cognitive performance is similar.13 Fatigue is a feeling of
physical and mental weariness resulting from exhaustion.14 A
lack of adequate sleep, therefore, inevitably causes fatigue.
The implications are frightening in light of the highly
complex duties of resident physicians, as the necessary skills of
job performance inevitably suffer. Studies prove that motor skills
such as the manual dexterity of surgical residents are vulnerable
to the effects of fatigue.15 One study of emergency residents
demonstrated “reductions in the comprehensiveness of history
and physical examination documentation” and a decline in
completion time for clinical task and accuracy tests.16 Beyond the
psychomotor skills required for the job, the long hours of

13

Sigrid Veasey et al., Sleep Loss and Fatigue in Residency Training,
288 JAMA 1116 (2002). The authors report that “performance testing of
vigilance (responsiveness to simple repeated tasks) and serial mathematical
calculations were equally affected by 24 hours of total sleep loss and 1 week
of sleep restriction to 5 hours per night.” Id. at 1116-17. The studies discussed
revealed that “cognitive performance [ ] of healthy young adults who were
sleep deprived . . . [are] below the mean.” Id. at 1117. Furthermore, verbal
processing and complex problem solving abilities were impaired, as evidenced
by the finding that, “[l]earning for both complex cognitive and procedural
tasks can decrease by up to 50% when sleep loss occurs. . . .” Id. In a study
observing the training experience of junior and senior residents,
“[p]erformances on simulated electrocardiogram, short term recall of a list of
things to do, and reaction times all deteriorated after being on call; these
postcall performance deficits were similar for junior and senior residents,
suggesting a lack of adaptation over time to the sleep-deprived state.” Id. The
authors also pointed out, however, that these types of studies must be
controlled for factors that affect sleepiness such as the intake of caffeine and
other stimulants, warm ambient temperature, reduced body temperature and
recent food intake. Id.
14
See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 665 (3d ed. 1992). See also
Lyznicki et al., supra note 10, at 1909 (defining fatigue as “a more complex
phenomenon that may be defined as the decreased capability of doing physical
or mental work, or the subjective state in which one can no longer perform a
task effectively”).
15
Veasey et al., supra note 13, at 1117.
16
Id.
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residency training have also been found to cause depression,
anxiety and anger.17 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, as
the long hours of residency training compound the effects of
fatigue, residents consistently lose vigor and empathetic concern
for patients.18
The increased incidence of motor vehicle crashes after work,
especially after on-call shifts, additionally manifest from fatigue
in resident physicians.19 One study compared sleep deprivation
17

See, e.g., Bellini et al., supra note 2, at 3143.
Id.; see also Amer Ardati, Don’t Overwork Physicians, Imperil Public,
DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 13, 2002 (quoting a resident physician in a Columbia
Presbyterian case study as stating, “if you’re on two nights in a row, you want
to do as little as possible. You give bad care.”); Bellini et al., supra note 2, at
3146 (commenting that “results . . . at the end of [the one year] internship
demonstrated a significant increase in personal distress coupled with a
decrease in empathetic concern”); Public Citizen, ACGME’s Proposed Limits
on Resident Physician Work Hours are Inadequate, Coalition Says (Feb. 11,
2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1021
(quoting Dr. Ruth Potee, national president of CIR/SEIU and a third-year
family practice resident at Boston Medical Center, who said, “The
consequences of working excessive hours is serious, both to our patients and
to ourselves. Auto accidents, complications of pregnancy, depression—all
disproportionately impact resident physicians. . .”).
19
See Veasey, supra note 13 at 1122 (finding that “the greatest
documented danger of sleep loss for medical residents is the risk of motor
vehicle crashes”); Carol Ann Campbell, Hospital Residents Plead for More
Rest–Two Lawmakers Hear the Tales of Fatigue, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), May 8, 2002, at 39 (quoting a resident at University of Medicine and
Dentistry of New Jersey, who mentioned “[o]ne of our residents fell asleep in
the parking lot and didn’t wake up until the morning.”); Sanjay Gupta, Is Your
Doctor Too Drowsy?, TIME, Mar. 11, 2002 at 17 (quoting a surgeon stating
that “[p]ractically every surgical resident I know has fallen asleep at the wheel
driving home from work . . . I know of three who have hit parked cars.
Another hit a ‘Jersey barrier’ on the New Jersey Turnpike, going 65 m.p.h.”);
Ivan Oransky, Post-call Fatigue Poses Risk for Residents, MED. STUDENT
JAMA,
May
24,
1999,
http://www.amaavailable
at
assn.org/scipubs/msjama/ articles/vol_281/no_21/post.htm (stating that
“[n]early every resident I know has either fallen asleep behind the wheel
driving home after call or knows someone involved in a post-call crash”). See
also AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, WHY DO PEOPLE HAVE DROWSY
DRIVING CRASHES? INPUT FROM DRIVERS WHO JUST DID (1999). Especially
18
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among on-call housestaff and faculty members, including its
effect on driving.20 Forty-four percent of housestaff had fallen
asleep at the wheel when stopped at a red light, versus twelve
percent of the faculty.21 Twenty-three percent of housestaff fell
asleep at the wheel while driving, versus eight percent for the
faculty.22 Overall, a total of forty-nine percent of housestaff had
fallen asleep at the wheel, with ninety percent of these incidents
occurring after an on-call shift.23 Similarly, the accident rate of
anesthesiology residents surveyed in another study was more than
twice the national average.24 The solution seems simple. Because
fatigue is a state of sleep deprivation, “[t]he most effective
countermeasure . . . is sleep.”25 Limitations placed on resident
work hours provide the opportunity to catch up on sleep,
presumably leading to less fatigue and, therefore, improved
patient care and resident health and safety.

relevant to the residency discussion are the conclusions that work and sleep
schedules are associated with car crashes, drivers in “sleep-crashes” are more
likely to involve an atypical schedule, and that “working the night shift
increases the odds of a sleep related (versus non-sleep-related) crash by nearly
6 times.” Id. at 50.
20
Marcus & Loughlin, supra note 10. The study utilized an anonymous
questionnaire mailed to pediatric residents and full-time faculty. Id. at 763.
The questionnaire included general questions about being on call, participating
in other types of nocturnal work, falling asleep while driving, traffic citations
and motor vehicle accidents. Id. All incidents relating to falling asleep at the
wheel occurred after on-call shifts. Id. The authors provided that “the study
has the limitations of a retrospective questionnaire study . . . and it is possible
that [housestaff] provided biased responses.” Id.
21
Id. at 764.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Gear et al., supra note 2. “Thirty-six-item questionnaires were mailed
to anesthesia residents in training at the Hospital of the University of
Pennsylvania . . . ask[ing] subjects to report on their own traffic accidents,
near accidents, or traffic violations occurring during their residency which
they attributed to post-call fatigue.” Id.
25
Veasey et al., supra note 13, at 1122.
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II. THE PUBLIC REGULATION PATH
Convinced that the hazardous effects of sleep loss and fatigue
for medical residents is a serious problem for patients and
residents, New York decided to regulate the work hours of
residents in its teaching hospitals.26 However, states throughout
the country have been slow to follow.27 Nonetheless, the problem
calls for attention, as evidenced by the current proposal to
nationalize the substance of the New York regulations in the form
of federal legislation.28
A. New York State’s Bell Regulations
The New York State Bell Regulations were largely motivated
by the Libby Zion case in which sleep loss and fatigue were
blamed for the alleged negligence of a resident physician.29 A
grand jury investigation attributed fault to the residency training
system, as opposed to doctors or the hospital.30 The regulations
26

See supra, note 3 (providing a brief history of the New York
Regulations).
27
Id. (noting that only New Jersey and Puerto Rico have proposed such
regulations).
28
See supra, note 4 (discussing the PPSPA).
29
See generally Dan Collins, A Father’s Grief, A Father’s Fight, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at E1. In 1984, Libby Zion was brought to New York
hospital after suffering from a high fever and earache. Id. She was given a
dosage of Demerol despite her use of an anti-depressant drug, Nardil. Id. A
mixture of the two drugs can be fatal, and Libby died within five hours. Id.
Her father filed a lawsuit against the hospital. Id. The claim included a charge
that the exhausted resident who prescribed the Demerol was negligent in
failing to realize that the combination of the two drugs can prove fatal. Id.
30
See Barbara A. DeBuono, The Medical Resident Workload, MED.
STUDENT JAMA (Dec. 2, 1998) (quoting the grand jury as stating, “[t]he most
serious deficiencies can be traced to the practice of permitting inexperienced
physicians to staff emergency rooms and allowing interns and junior residents
to practice medicine without supervision.”), available at, http://www.amaassn.org/sci-pubs/msjama/vol_280/no_21/jms81019.htm.; see also Daniela
Lamas, Residency, Round the Clock: New Rules Seek to Ease Training
Doctors’ Fatigue, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 15, 2002, at E1.
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are designed to protect resident health and patient care through
scheduling and resident work hour limits.
First, the Bell Regulations provide that “the scheduled work
week shall not exceed an average of eighty hours per week over a
four week period.”31 While the cumulative hours of a given work
week may exceed eighty, the four week average must meet the
criteria.32 The regulations are flexible, therefore, in that they
reasonably account for patient care needs that require a rigorous
work week, while maintaining a four week average to allow
adequate rest.
Second, “trainees shall not be scheduled to work for more
than twenty-four consecutive hours.”33 This section addresses the
detrimental effects that result from sleeplessness but also
recognizes the hospital’s need to provide round-the-clock patient
care services to the public. Although twenty-four consecutive
hours without sleep is arguably dangerous, the regulations at least
set a clearly defined limit.34
Third, the regulations provide that on-call duty shall not be
included in the twenty-four and eighty hour limits, so long as
“such duty is scheduled for each trainee no more often than every
third night . . . [and] a continuous assignment that includes night
shift on-call duty [must be] followed by a non-working period of
no less than sixteen hours.”35 On-call duty can demand
extraordinarily long hours of work without sleep.36 The
31

10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(a) (2002).
10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(a) (2002).
33
10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4 (b)(6)(ii)(b)
(2002).
34
10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4 (b)(6)(ii)(b)
(2002). See also Patton et al., supra note 5, at 380 (reporting that “researchers
have even compared the effects of sleep deprivation to the effects of alcohol
intoxication”).
35
10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 10, § 405.4(b)(6)(ii)(d)(2)-(3)
(2002).
36
See, e.g., David Abel, Bill Eyes Guidelines on Work Hours for Medical
Residents, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2001, at B1 (stating that a former
resident of Baltimore’s Johns Hopkins Hospital abandoned her surgical
training after falling asleep during a 60-hour shift without rest); Gupta, supra
32
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regulations mandate that hospitals at least spread out on-call
shifts so residents can consistently obtain a reasonable amount of
rest while completing their regular weekly schedules.
These seemingly realistic regulations account for hospitals’
staffing needs while limiting the inherent sleep deprivation
problems of residency training methods. New York hospitals,
however, continue to schedule residents beyond the prescribed
limits.37 Although the Bell Regulations focus on reducing fatigue,
enforcement of the prescribed limits has twice proven the
regulations somewhat ineffective, both in 1998 and 2002.38
note 19 at 73 (stating that “it [is] not unusual to work 40 hours in a row
without rest”).
37
See Health Department Cites 54 Teaching Hospitals, supra note 7.
These 2002 violations came four years after a first wave of sweeping
inspection by the Department of Health. New York State Department of
Health, NYS Hospitals Fined for Violating Resident Work Hours (June 18,
1998) [hereinafter NYS Hospitals Fined], available at http://www.health.
state.ny.us/nysdoh/commish/98/workhrs.htm. The department issued a report
based on a survey of twelve teaching hospitals “showing widespread abuse of
resident work hour limits, particularly among surgical residents in New York
City.” Id. The report specifically found that all first year residents in the
cardiovascular surgical program worked 110-130 hours per week. Id. Ten of
eighteen surgical residents worked in excess of eighty-five hours per week. Id.
Finally, residents were found to have worked until 8 p.m. after a thirty-six
hour shift only to return to work at 6 a.m. the next day. Id.
38
See id. (reporting the 1998 violations); Health Department Cites 54
Teaching Hospitals, supra note 7 (reporting the 2002 violations). The
Department of Health contracted with IPRO, an independent not-for-profit
corporation, to monitor resident working hours in New York State. IPRO,
New York State Resident Work Hour Regulations (n.d.). As of May 2003,
however, the annual report had not been published so it is difficult to assess
whether IPRO has been more successful. Furthermore, the Accreditation
Council for Graduate Medical Education (“ACGME”), the body in control of
determining accreditation of teaching hospitals, announced its own enforceable
guidelines applicable to residency programs beginning July 3, 2003.
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, Resident Duty Hours
Language (Feb. 13, 2003), [hereinafter Resident Duty Hours Language]
available at http://www.acgggme.org/DutyHours/dutyHoursLang_final.asp.
Also mirroring in large part the New York State Bell Regulations, these
guidelines seek to self-regulate the teaching hospitals with the enforcement
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B. The Patient and Physician Safety and Protection Act of
2001

The PPSPA essentially mirrors the Bell Regulations in regard
to specific regulation of residents’ work hours and schedules.39
Supported by findings drawn from scientific evidence asserting
that the effects of fatigue manifest in compromised patient care
and endangered resident health, the legislation appropriately
recognizes that resident work hours need to be reduced.
For example, unlike the state regulations, however, the
federal legislation contains unique enforcement mechanisms. The
Act conditions receipt of federal funds on compliance with the
work hour limits.40 Furthermore, the Act provides an incentive to
mechanism of more frequent review of programs. Id. For example, during
routine accreditation surveys in 1999, the ACGME issued citations for work
hour violations to 11.7% of programs surveyed. Jay Greene, More
Residencies Cited for Work Violations, AMNEWS, Mar. 6, 2000, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prl20306.htm. ACGME
officials stated that citations had been increasing over the past few years. Id.
Nevertheless, “[t]o date, the ACGME has not withdrawn accreditation of any
program solely for overworking residents.” Id. Therefore, while setting limits
for the number of hours residents are allowed to work in accreditated hospitals
recognizes the problem, lack of enforcement will have trouble solving it. In
comparison, the New York State Department of Health attempts, as an
external regulator, to implement a rational work environment for residency
training programs. If the shortcomings demonstrated in the 1998 and 2002
reports are any indication of the problem of enforcement, truly internal
enforcement by the ACGME is limited as well if enforcement has no teeth.
But see Jaya Agrawal, Resident Education and Safety, 66 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 1569 (2002) (reporting that the Yale surgical residency program is
at risk of losing accreditation unless changes are made with respect to the
number of hours residents work).
39
See generally H.R. 3236, supra note 2. Similarities include the eightyhour work week, twenty-four consecutive hour limit and required time off
between shifts. Compare 10 N.Y. COMP CODES R & REGS., tit. 10, §
405.4(b)(6)(ii) with H.R. 3236, § 3 (j)(1)(A).
40
H.R. 3236, supra note 2, at § 3 (j)(1)(A). This distinction is found in
an enforcement mechanism: “ . . . [A]s a condition of participation under this
title each hospital shall establish the following limits on working hours.” Id.
Thus far, assigning standards to the guarantee of federal funds as a
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hospitals that successfully conform to the new standards within
five years.41
Like the Bell Regulations, which generated public attention
by highlighting the conditions of residency programs, federal
legislation could spark national awareness of the issues
concerning residents—especially because it is likely that
everyone, at some point in their lives, will rely on a resident
physician in a time of need.42 The national community responding
to the concerns of fatigue, coupled with the past success of
tailoring federal funds to government standards and the financial
incentive offered for compliance, indicates that the PPSPA takes
what New York has attempted to achieve a step further.
While violations of the New York regulations are well
documented, not all hospitals, or departments or specialties
within hospitals, fail to comply.43 Therefore, even though certain

conditioning device has proven successful. Dori Page Antonetti, A Dose of
Their Own Medicine: Why the Federal Government Must Ensure Healthy
Working Conditions for Medical Residents and How Reform Should be
Accomplished, 51 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 875, 913 (2002). The Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 imposed residency program guidelines for federal funding
on teaching hospitals in order to better serve public health. Id. By attaching
conditions to federal grants, thus providing a powerful incentive for hospitals
to follow such guidelines, the legislation proved successful in that all of the
goals of the initiative were met. Id.
41
H.R. 3236, supra note 2, at § 4 (providing funds).
42
In fact, according to the results of the 2002 Sleep in America poll,
conducted by the National Sleep Foundation, the respondents indicated, on
average, the maximum amount of time a doctor should work is 9.8 hours per
day. NATIONAL SLEEP FOUNDATION, 2002 “SLEEP IN AMERICA” POLL (2002).
Eighty-six percent also stated that if they knew their doctor was working for
twenty-four consecutive hours, they would feel anxious about their safety, and
seventy percent would ask for another doctor. Id at 26. Similar results
reflected concern involving drowsy airplane pilots, and workplace overtime
generally. Id. at 27-28; see also, Antonetti, supra note 40, at 909 (observing
that “[n]ewspapers, documentaries, and popular television programs have shed
light on the problem of excessive work hours during residency . . . expos[ing]
a system previously hidden from the public eye, and . . . spark[ing] criticism
and outrage”).
43
See, e.g., Anne Barnard & Liz Kowalczyk, Medical Resident Workload
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hospitals may not maintain a perfect record, they have made
strides in reducing residents’ workloads.44 Still, public regulation
as a solution to problems resulting from the excessive work
schedules of resident physicans is far from perfect, as
demonstrated by the ability of hospitals to function while
absorbing the costs of fines.45 The PPPSA appropriates amounts
to cover the “incremental costs incurred in order to comply with
the requirements imposed by [the] Act.”46 Therefore, federal
regulation that invests in the system it seeks to regulate is a step
in the right direction.
Curbed, Big Impact Seen on Hub Hospitals, BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 2002,
at A1. Brigham and Women’s Hospital has cut back the hours in their surgery
program to eighty to eighty-five hours. Id. Dr. Michael Zinner, Chief of
Surgery, planned to require doctors to sacrifice research time to help cover
shifts, hire more physicians’ assistants and provide additional training to
nurses. Id. Brighman and Women’s and Yale-New Haven Medical Center
estimated that changing their surgery programs could cost $1 million a year.
Id.; see also Jay Greene, Residencies Successful in Curbing Work-Hour
Violations, AMNEWS (July 30, 2001), available at http://ama-assn.org/scipubs/amnews/pick_01/prsc0730.htm.
44
The regulations force hospitals to reduce resident physicians’
workloads and assume financial burdens. For example, Jackson Memorial
Hospital in Miami has dealt with the eighty hour week for more than six
years, since residents unionized and bargained for change. See Lamas, supra
note 30. While residents are not barred from working beyond the eighty
hours, the hospital did hire “physician extenders,” laboratory technicians,
nurse practitioners and physician assistants. Id. This additional personnel may
help to “fill the gaps,” but it is noteworthy that the annual overtime budget ran
out after four months. Id.; see also Jackie Jadrnak, Residents Defend
Schedule, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, July 8, 2002, at C1. Steve McKernan,
CEO of the University of New Mexico Hospital, in responding to cutting
resident work hours, “It’s going to be more expensive. We’ve routinely been
adding advance-practice nurses.” Id. However, hiring more advance-practice
nurses comes at almost twice the cost. Id. But see Agrawal, supra note 38.
45
See Health Department Cites 54 Teaching Hospitals, supra note 7;
NYS Hospitals Fined, supra note 37.
46
H.R. 3236, supra note 2, at § 4. Compare Antonetti, supra note 40
(stating that in authorizing financial assistance, “the federal government may
provide teaching programs with total funds up to $1 trillion in 2003, $800
million in 2005, $400 million in 2006, and $200 million in 2007”).
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III. TORT LIABILITY FOR HOSPITALS AS AN ALTERNATIVE
DETERRENT
Regardless of good intentions, the enforcement problems in
New York require creative thinking to accomplish the task of
reducing resident work hours in the name of improved health
care and healthier residents. When a fatigued resident commits a
medical error that causes injury, a negligence claim arises and an
explanation of why the negligence occurred is inconsequential.
Therefore, while fatigue may increase the number of medical
errors, the issue may be moot in the context of medical
malpractice. When a resident falls asleep at the wheel after an
exhausting shift, however, analogous case law illustrates that
actual fatigue and its cause become a central theme in litigation.
A. Robertson v. LeMaster
In Robertson v. LeMaster, the Supreme Court of West
Virginia found a railroad company liable for damages from an
accident caused by an employee who fell asleep driving home
from work.47 After laboring for more than twenty-six hours at a
train derailment site, the employee, LeMaster, finally insisted
that he was too tired to continue working.48 The employer
suggested that if he would not work, he should go home.49
Another railroad employee drove LeMaster to his car—LeMaster
fell asleep with a lit cigarette in his hand during the ride.50 On his
way home he fell asleep at the wheel, resulting in an accident
with Robertson.51
In his claim against the railroad, Robertson argued that the
company “knew or should have known that its employee

47
48
49
50
51

301 S.E. 2d 563, 565 (W. Va. 1983).
Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 565 (W. Va. 1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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constituted a menace to the health and safety of the public.”52 The
railroad contended it had no duty, as a matter of law, to control
an employee acting outside the scope of employment.53 In the
alternative, it argued that any negligence on its part was not the
proximate cause of the injuries sustained, and the employee’s
negligence was an independent intervening cause that cut the
string of causation.54
On the issue of duty, the Robertson court recognized that
under traditional principles of tort law, an employer has no duty
to control employees outside the scope of employment.55
Nevertheless, the court asserted that the issue was not whether
the employee was to be controlled, but, rather, “whether the
[railroad’s] conduct prior to the accident created a foreseeable
risk of harm.”56 According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
an affirmative act may give rise to a duty to use reasonable care
if such an act creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another.57
Here, requiring an employee to work unreasonably long hours,
driving him to his vehicle and sending him on the highway in an
exhausted condition satisfied the requirement for such an act.58 In
addition, the court considered “the likelihood of injury, the
magnitude of the burden in guarding against it, and the
consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.”59 The
court held that a reasonable jury could find that the employee,
after working excessive hours, was in such an exhausted
condition that driving caused a foreseeable and unreasonable risk
of harm to motorists.60 In the view of the Supreme Court of West
Virginia, the duty analysis is primarily driven by foreseeability.
52

Id.
Id.
54
Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 565 (W. Va. 1983).
55
Id. at 567.
56
Id.
57
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965), cited in Robertson,
301 S.E.2d at 567.
58
Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 568-69.
59
Id. at 568.
60
Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 570 (W. Va. 1983).
53
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The court also rejected the railroad’s argument that the
employee-driver’s negligence constituted an intervening cause
that broke the chain of causation as a matter of law.61 Robertson
argued that LeMaster’s negligent driving was caused by fatigue
directly attributable to the employer’s negligence in imposing
unreasonable work hours.62 The plaintiff argued that the
employer’s negligence “reduced the capability of its employee to
think and act as a reasonable person.”63 Further, the plaintiff
argued that if the intervening cause can be reasonably anticipated,
liability may be imposed on the defendant because “the risk
created by the defendant may include the intervention of the
foreseeable negligence of others.”64
Foreseeability of harm, as with duty, played a critical role in
the court’s analysis of causation, and the plaintiff won the day.65
The employee arguably broke the chain of causation through his
own negligence—that is, by deciding to drive while fatigued.
Despite this fact, the court found it reasonable to attribute this
seemingly independent decision to the negligence of the employer
in requiring an unreasonable work schedule.66 Since the alleged
negligence of the employee did not “constitute a new effective
cause and operate independently,” such an intervening cause
could not “relieve a person charged with negligence in
connection with an injury.”67 Moreover, since the intervening
cause could be anticipated after such unreasonable hours, the
court held that the jury could conclude “LeMaster’s negligent
conduct was a direct result of the mental fatigue and physical
61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971)).
65
Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 570 (W. Va. 1983). (stating
that if “[t]he Defendant railway’s negligence reduced the capability of its
employee to think and act as a reasonable person . . . LeMaster’s conduct
would not constitute an intervening cause so as to relieve the railway company
of liability”).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 569 (quoting, Lester v. Rose, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963)).
62
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exhaustion attributable to the [employer’s] negligence.”68
Therefore, the employer’s creation of a poor judgment maker,
the employee, outweighed any negligence on the part of
LeMaster himself.69
In the context of overworked medical residents, a hospital is
likely to argue that the resident knew of his or her fatigue and
weakened ability to drive safely, yet made the decision to drive
home.70 At that moment, the employee becomes a causal actor
and, arguably, the cause of the accident.71 Applying Robertson’s
reasoning, however, by scheduling unreasonable hours and
causing sleep deprivation, the hospital creates an environment in
which the ability of a resident to make sound judgments is
significantly damaged.72 As such, although the resident makes a
68

Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 570.
The court reversed and remanded with instructions that reasonable
persons may draw different conclusions from the evidence and facts of the
record regarding responsibility for plaintiff’s injuries. Id. Presumably, after
the directed verdict of the lower court in favor of the employer was reversed,
thus opening the door to potential liability, the case settled. Id. Therefore,
although the court did not expressly hold that the railroad was negligent in
working its employees for an excessive number of hours, its willingness to
give a theory of negligence with third-party liability to the jury revealed that it
considered the cause of action legally sound. Indeed, the court opined that “if
the intervening cause is one which is to be reasonably anticipated, the
defendant may be liable, for ‘[t]he risk created by the defendant may include
the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others.” Id. (quoting W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed.) (1971)). Thus, in the employeremployee context, it appears that the employer may commit acts sufficient to
create legal causation. Id. Resident physicians become exhausted and fall
asleep at the wheel often because of excessive work hours. See Lyznicki et al.,
supra note 10. Therefore, assigning long hours as a condition of employment
would seemingly swallow any negligence on the part of the resident-driver.
70
See Robertson, 301 S.E. 2d at 569. In Robertson, the court articulated
the employer’s defense that it was not the proximate cause of the car accident
occurring during the commute from work. Id. “The thrust of the [employer’s]
argument . . . is that the negligence of [the employee] constituted an
independent intervening cause of the accident that broke the chain of
causation.” Id.
71
Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 569 (W. Va. 1983).
72
See Patton et al., supra note 5, at 380 (observing “[s]ome researchers
69
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conscious, albeit distorted, decision to drive home despite feeling
exhausted, a strong causal relationship exists between the
creation of sleep deprivation through excessive scheduling and
falling asleep at the wheel.73
B. Faverty v. McDonald’s
An appellate court in Oregon similarly analyzed third-party
liability of an employer for injuries resulting from an automobile
accident involving an employee who had worked long hours.74 In
Faverty v. McDonald’s, the employee, a high-school student,
worked at one of McDonald’s fast food restaurants.75 He worked
his usual shift, 3:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.76 He also worked a cleanup
shift from midnight until 5 a.m. and continued to work yet
another shift from 5 a.m. until 8:21 a.m., at which point he
asked to leave because he felt sleepy.77 Shortly after being
allowed to leave, the employee began his trip home and either
became drowsy or fell asleep at the wheel and caused the
accident.78 The plaintiff, Faverty, was injured and the employee
died in the accident.79 The plaintiff settled his claims against the
employee’s representatives and pursued a claim against
McDonald’s, alleging that McDonald’s was negligent in
scheduling its employee too many hours without allowing
adequate time for rest.80
As in Robertson, the employer’s initial argument focused on
the absence of duty.81 Specifically, McDonald’s argued it could
have even compared the effects of sleep deprivation to the effects of alcohol
intoxication”).
73
Robertson, 301 S.E. 2d at 569.
74
Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
75
Id. at 705.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 705 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
81
Id. at 706; Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 565 (W. Va.
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not be held liable as a matter of law because it had no duty to
prevent an employee from working as many hours as the
employee in this case did.82 The court disagreed.83 Rather than
analyzing whether the employee could or should be controlled,
the court agreed with the plaintiff that liability depends on
whether the employer created a foreseeable risk to a protected
interest of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff.84 The court
held that, even absent a special relationship, a defendant “is
subject to a general duty to avoid conduct that unreasonably
creates a foreseeable risk of harm to a plaintiff.”85 Therefore, the
court concluded that McDonald’s created a duty because it should
have foreseen that an employee working three shifts in a twentyfour hour period posed a risk of harm for motorists when that
exhausted employee drove home from work.86
McDonald’s next argued that, even if subject to this general
duty, there was no evidence that it knew or should have known
that the employee was so fatigued that it could have foreseen the
possibility of an accident.87 The court rejected these arguments
1983).
82

Faverty, 892 P.2d at 706 (noting that the employer relied on Sections
315 and 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts). Section 315 of the
Restatement provides that “there is no duty to control the conduct of a third
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless . . . a
special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). Section 317 provides an exception to
Section 315’s general rule of nonliability for failing to control the conduct of
third persons by placing the master under a duty to exercise reasonable care if
the servant is either on the master’s premises or is using the master’s chattel at
the time of injury. Id. at § 317. Since the accident that caused the injuries did
not occur on the employer’s premises, and the employee was not at that time
using the employer’s chattel, the exception provided by Section 317 did not
apply. Faverty, 892 P.2d at 708. Therefore, the employer argued that the
general rule of nonliability for the conduct of third persons should apply. Id.
83
Id. at 706.
84
Id. at 708.
85
Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 708 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
86
Id. at 710.
87
Id. at 709.
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based on the facts.88 Because McDonald’s controlled all of the
work assignments, the court concluded it knew how often its
employees were working.89 McDonald’s had a policy against
working high school students after midnight and, when
necessary, it did so only once a week.90 A similar company
policy prohibited employees from working two shifts in one
day.91 The court found that McDonald’s knew of two recent
accidents involving employees leaving work late and falling
asleep at the wheel.92 There was also evidence that the employee
was visibly fatigued, and the managers on staff that evening
observed the employee throughout his shift.93 Given these facts,
the court determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that
the employer knew or should have known that working its
employee so many hours would negatively affect his ability to
drive, and the employer should have foreseen the risk of a car
accident after its employee worked three shifts in less than
twenty-four hours.94
Finally, McDonald’s argued that since the employee
“volunteered” for the cleanup project, it could not be negligent as
a matter of law.95 The court was not persuaded.96 The court found
88

Id.
Id.
90
Id.
91
Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 709 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).The
court observed, “According to at least one of [the employer’s] managers,
those policies were adopted and enforced out of concern that employees not
become overly tired on the job.” Id. Therefore, the employer’s violation of a
self-imposed policy factored in to the court’s analysis in siding with the
plaintiff.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 710.
94
Id. The existence of self-imposed shift limits indicated that the
employer knew of the risk involved with overworking high school employees.
Id. at 709 (stating that “according to at least one of [the employer’s]
managers, those policies were adopted and enforced out of concern that
employees not become overly tired on the job”).
95
Id. at 710.
96
Id.
89
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that the employer affirmatively asked the employee to work,
controlled all work assignments and penalized employees for not
working as assigned.97 Acknowledging the vulnerable position of
employees hesitant to fill shifts and complete special duties, such
as cleanup projects, the court noted that even if the employee
volunteered the managers knew that assigning this shift to this
employee would violate company policies.98 In addition, the court
seized upon the fact that the managers were aware of the
employee’s condition and compared the managers to “a bartender
who serve[s] to a visibly intoxicated person who then cause[s] an
automobile accident that harmed another” after that customer
“volunteers” to pay for the drink.99
97

Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 710 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. (stating that plaintiff did not “out of the blue, volunteer to take three
shifts in one 24-hour period. Defendant affirmatively asked him to work those
hours.”).
99
Id. Dram Shop Acts provide an illustrative example. See, e.g., Michael
L. Young, Note, Reinventing the “Legislative Intent, or Rather the Legislative
Mandate” on Dram Shop Liability in Missouri: A Look at Kilmer v. Mun, 45
ST. LOUIS. U. L. J. 625 (2001). At common law, tavern owners “were not
liable for injuries suffered by the patron or a third party because the proximate
cause of the injuries was the patron’s consumption of alcoholic beverages, and
that patron’s negligent driving or other behavior, not the tavern or restaurant
owner’s sale of the beverages.” Id. at 629. Although the Prohibition Era’s
Dram Shop Act was repealed at the end of Prohibition in 1934, it remained a
criminal offense to serve alcoholic beverages to minors or “habitual drunkards
and the apparently intoxicated.” Id. at 632. By the 1980s, however, in
response to the terrible problems involved with drunk driving, Missouri, and
many other jurisdictions abrogated the traditional proximate cause rule. Id. By
1983, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that “plaintiffs [including third
parties] could bring a civil action against tavern owners by expanding the duty
of care dram shop owners owe to the public when selling alcoholic beverages
to their customers.” Id. at 635. This was justified on the grounds that since an
intoxicated person is more likely to cause harm than a sober person, “tavern
owners [have] a duty of care to stop serving alcoholic beverages to intoxicated
persons.” Id. In 1985, however, Missouri became the only state to pass
legislation that requires criminal conviction of a tavern owner before civil
liability can be imposed. Id. at 639. Today, only a few states have no dram
shop liability at all. Id. The Missouri courts have responded to passage of this
law with judicially activist interpretation in creating broad areas of liability.
98
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Faverty illustrates the fact-sensitive nature of negligence
cases. The court looked at the circumstances of the case to
determine that a reasonable jury could find the employer
negligent.100 It is important to note that the fact that the employer
in Faverty worked the employee beyond its own rules was crucial
to the court’s decision.101 Without such a policy and blatant
violation, the court may not have reached the same result.102
As significant as Faverty may be, the case provides little
guidance as to what actually constitutes a reasonable work
schedule. In concluding that liability was reasonable, the Faverty
court found a duty arising out of the foreseeable risks of harm
and consequences of employers’ actions towards their
employees.103 Therefore, working an employee an unreasonable
number of hours and thus creating a foreseeable risk of falling
asleep at the wheel and causing an accident also creates a duty to
prevent such harm.104 The Faverty court’s failure to provide any
working guidelines however, renders the opinion open to the
criticism that its decision was value-driven or merely an
extraordinary case with abysmal decisionmaking on the part of
the employer, thus supplying little precedential value.105
See generally id.
100
Faverty, 892 P.2d at 710.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 709-10. Similarly, the existence of a federal regulation does not
necessarily give rise to negligence per se. Parker v. R & L Carriers, Inc., 560
S.E.2d 114 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). In Parker, the employee, a truck driver,
violated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations by driving beyond the
number of hours permitted. Id. The court found that irrelevant to the
employee’s running a red light. Id. at 115. “The proximate cause of the
accident was the failure to yield the right of way, not the failure to follow
federal regulations. [The employee’s] inattention or fatigue may have
explained his failure to yield the right of way . . . but whether his fatigue
violated a federal regulation is irrelevant.” Id.
103
Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 710 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
104
Id.
105
See Lesser v. Nordstrom, Inc., Nos. CIV. A. 96-8121, CIV. A. 976070, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 12607 *13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1998) (holding that an
employee’s twelve-hour shift, as opposed to her normal ten hours, does not
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create “a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether there was ‘a
foreseeable risk of harm which the employer had a duty to guard against’”);
Hershman v. New Line Prods., Inc., No. B145028, 2001 WL 1470360 at *3
(Cal. App. 2 Dist., Nov. 20, 2001) (stating that “a 19-hour shift and 70 hours
in the preceding five days was not enough of a factual basis upon which to
impose liability”). The majority of courts are hesitant to impose third-party
liability on employers for the tortious acts of employees during the commute.
See, e.g., McNeil v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 36 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.
2001). In McNeil, the court refused to impose liability on the grounds of an
absence of a legally recognized duty to third parties. Id. at 251. The employee
received less than fifteen hours of sleep over the course of four days at the
employer’s drilling rig site. Id. at 249. On the fourth day, the employee
decided to drive home to rest, instead of utilizing the on-site sleeping quarters
provided by the employer. Id. The employee neither complained to
supervisors about his lack of sleep, nor discussed his plan to rest at home. Id.
During the drive, after making stops at a store, car wash and another drilling
rig, he fell asleep at the wheel and crashed into the plaintiff, injuring her. Id.
The court began its analysis by determining whether an “employer assumes a
duty over its employee’s off-duty conduct when the employer is aware of the
employee’s incapacity and affirmatively attempts to control the employee.” Id.
at 250. Lacking sufficient knowledge of the employee’s state of fatigue, the
duty question was dismissed. Id. at 251. Furthermore, the court stated that
employers are not legally required to “monitor their employees before
allowing them to leave work”, and employers implementing safety policies “to
prevent employee incapacity do not assume a duty to third parties.” Id.; see
also D’Amico v. Christie, 518 N.E.2d 896 (N.Y. 1987). In comparing Otis
Engineering v. Clark, infra pp. 21-24, the court noted that it had not come
across sufficient facts in which the employer “virtually placed its employee
behind the wheel.” Id. at 902. Since the employer could not have reasonably
controlled the employee’s conduct, “plaintiffs [ ] failed to demonstrate any
legal duty in the existing law of this State that [the employer] can be said to
have breached.” Id.; Depew v. Crocodile Enterprises, Inc., 73 Cal. Rptr.2d
673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). The employee worked 17.5 hours, then another six
hours after he had sixteen hours during which he did not have to work. Id. at
678. During the drive home, the employee caused an automobile accident with
the plaintiff. Id. The court concluded “there was an insufficient causal nexus
between [the employee’s] employment and [plaintiff’s] death.” Id.
However, the fact-sensitive nature of negligence cases permits liability to
be imposed under certain circumstances. See Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892
P.2d 703 (Or. Ct. App. 1995); Otis Engineering v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307
(Tex. App. 1983); Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563 (W. Va. 1983).
Therefore, a plaintiff is well-advised to assert the existence of egregious work

GEFELLMACROXX.DOC

7/7/03 11:27 AM

REFORMING MEDICAL RESIDENCY PROGRAMS

669

Nonetheless, even if the line to draw for an excessive work
schedule is usually difficult, if not impossible, Faverty
demonstrates that egregious circumstances can give rise to thirdparty liability.

conditions that give rise to fatigue, knowledge of such fatigue on the part of
the employer and then, pursuant to such knowledge, affirmative conduct in
releasing or sending the employee out on the road. See Bowen, supra note 6.
In discussing this duty issue, the difficulty seems to arise at the inability to
determine the nature of such duty. Id. at 2103. On the one hand, a finding of
negligence could be grounded upon nonfeasance—“failure to prevent the
employee from leaving in an incapacitated state”—or, in the alternative,
misfeasance—“allowing, if not requiring, the employee to work long hours
and then setting the visibly exhausted employee on the road to drive home.”
Id. The Robertson and Faverty courts relied upon the latter. Id. at 2104. The
nonfeasance path severely limits third-party liability by requiring the employer
to stop the employee from driving home. Moreover, it “ignores the possibility
that the employer has voluntarily entered an affirmative course of action
affecting the interests of one of its employees and has thereby assumed a duty
to act with reasonable care.” Id. at 2105. On the other hand, the concept of
misfeasance recognizes the causal relationship between the affirmative act of
imposing a grueling work schedule and the hazard of driving an automobile in
an exhausted state. “The Robertson court seemed to suggest that the duty arose
sometime during the excessive work period, while the Faverty court seemed to
suggest that the duty arose as early as the point of scheduling.” Id. at 2109. In
synthesizing Faverty, Bower suggests that the court should have been more
explicit: “The employee’s schedule was excessive, he became visibly
incapacitated, he asked to go home, and he was released—end of analysis.” Id.
at 2110. Without such precise instruction, applying these principles to the
hospital-resident scenario raises similar problems. On the one hand, hospitals
have for years administered residency programs that are grueling, in which
residents become incapacitated and leave work to drive home after a long
shift. See Marcus & Loughlin, supra note 10. Therefore, if the case is one of
negligent scheduling, the hospital is negligent on a weekly, if not daily, basis.
On the other hand, if the scheduling is not excessive on its face, and liability
depends on the existence of an employer’s affirmative act that creates a
foreseeable danger to others, the release of the visibly incapacitated employee
constitutes negligence. In that case, employer liability has a stronger case
because the employer not only caused the incapacitation but also failed to
guard against it. This is in line with the theory of misfeasance.
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C. Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark

In Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, an appellate court in
Texas adopted the Robertson reasoning and held that an employer
has a duty to prevent employees under its control from causing a
foreseeable risk of harm to others.106 In Otis, an employee with a
history of drinking on the job was visibly intoxicated at work.107
After he returned from his dinner break, his supervisor suggested
that he go home and escorted him to his car.108 The supervisor
asked if he could make it home and the employee replied that he
could.109 Thirty minutes later, the employee caused an accident
that killed two women.110 The employee’s blood alcohol level was
so high that an expert opined that “100% of persons with that
much alcohol in their systems exhibit signs of intoxication
observable to the average person.”111 The supervisors were aware
of his intoxication and that he was in no condition to drive.112
Furthermore, the employer maintained a nurses’ station for ill or
disabled employees.113 Nonetheless, the supervisor chose to send
the employee out on the highway.114
106
107

668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. App. 1983).
Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App.

1983).
108

Id.
Id.
110
Id. Larry and Clifford Clark brought a wrongful death action against
the Otis Engineering Corporation after the Clarks’ wives were killed in the
automobile accident involving one of Otis’ employees. Id.
111
Id. at 308.
112
Id.
113
Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 308-09 (Tex. App.
1983).
114
Id. at 308. Clark contended that the affirmative act of the employer of
sending home an employee known to be intoxicated imposed a duty on the
employer to act in a nonnegligent manner. Id. at 309. Not only were there
alternatives, but the affirmative act also subjected other motorists to the
dangers of an accident on the highway. Id. at 311. The court noted the
availability of an on-site nurses’ station, and the options of calling a taxi or the
police, and contacting the family for transportation. Id. Otis asserted that an
109
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Echoing Robertson, the court recognized that an employer is
ordinarily liable only for the off-duty torts of employees
committed either on the employer’s premises or with the
employer’s chattels.115 The court opined, however, that all
persons have a general duty not to engage in any affirmative act
that may worsen a situation.116 “[P]ersuaded by the logic” of
Robertson and other decisions that focus the duty inquiry on
foreseeability,117 the court articulated a standard of duty:
[w]hen, because of an employee’s incapacity, an employer
exercises control over the employee, the employer has a
duty to take such action as a reasonably prudent employer
under the same or similar circumstances would take to
prevent the employee from causing an unreasonable risk
of harm to others.118
Accordingly, the court remanded for the jury to decide whether
Otis acted as a reasonable and prudent employer in light of the
surrounding facts and circumstances.119
A vigorous dissent in Otis expressed concern that placing a
duty on the employer for injuries involving off-duty employees
reaches too far.120 Noting the affirmative conduct of the employer
in Robertson, the dissenting judge found no such affirmative act
on the part of Otis and viewed the issue as a matter of
employer owes no duty to Clark and motorists in general. Id. at 309.
115
Id. at 311.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 311.
119
Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. App.
1983). After the employer initially won on summary judgment, the court of
appeals reversed and remanded. Id. at 307. The employer took an appeal to
the Texas Supreme Court. Id. The supreme court affirmed the holding of the
court of appeals, which recognized the availability of alternative measures at
the employer’s discretion, including a nurse station or a possible phone call to
the employee’s wife. Id. The court also noted the obviously foreseeable
consequences of sending its visibly intoxicated employee on the road to drive
home. Id.
120
Id. (McGee, J., dissenting) (stating that “the majority has placed an
impractical and unreasonable duty upon all employers”).
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nonfeasance because the employer failed to prevent the employee
from driving home.121 Hence, the dissent forewarned “[i]f this
rationale is followed, any omission will be regarded as an
affirmative act,” thus opening the door to infinite liability.122 This
“slippery slope” argument foresees an overly expansive scheme
of liability and erosion of individual responsibility for one’s
actions.123
While the dissent presented valid concerns, the argument
hinged on the fact that in Otis the employee, as opposed to the
employer, created the perilous situation.124 In other words, the
employee became intoxicated independent of any actions by the
employer.125 Therefore, according to the dissent, liability should
not be placed on an employer when they played no part in
contributing to the employee’s debilitating condition.126 This
reasoning is obviously inapplicable, however, when the employer
is the cause of the condition.
D. The Workers’ Compensation Parallel
Workers’ compensation cases also provide helpful analysis of
the question of third-party liability.127 The issue for workers’
121

Id. at 315. In Robertson, the employee’s exhaustion was caused by the
affirmative act of the employer in requiring the employee to work a grueling
number of hours; here, such an affirmative act was not present. Id. Since the
employer in Otis played no role in generating the employee’s incapacity, that
is, drunkenness, Robertson was distinguishable. Id. “It is an unfair type of
circuitous reasoning to say that [the employer] engaged in an ‘affirmative act’
when it ‘affirmatively’ failed to fire [the employee], or restrain him,” after
becoming aware of his intoxication. Id.
122
Id. The dissent concluded that, “[i]n an attempt to do justice in this
one case, the majority has placed an impractical and unreasonable duty upon
all employers.” Id. at 318.
123
Id. at 319.
124
Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. App.
1983).
125
Id.
126
Id. at 312.
127
For example, in Van Devander v. Heller Electric Co., the Circuit
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Court of the District of Columbia rejected the employer’s argument that a
compensation award should not be extended to injuries sustained while the
employee was proceeding to or from work. 405 F.2d 1108, 1110 (D.C. Cir.
1968). The “Coming and Going” rule excludes injuries suffered during the
commute to and from work from workers’ compensation because that activity
is considered outside the scope of employment. Id. However, the rule
addresses only ordinary and routine hazards that are incident to travel. Id. The
court distinguished the “Coming and Going” rule from “unusual hazards
arising out of foreseeable and abnormal consequences of requiring an
employee to remain at work for 26 hours.” Id. In essence, because falling
asleep at the wheel was a direct result of working long hours, the accidental
injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Id. Therefore, the court
found a causal nexus between the employer’s excessive demands of
employment and the employee’s injury that resulted from employment-induced
exhaustion. Id. Accordingly, the employee was compensated because his
“fatigue was a consequence of 26 hours of uninterrupted employment without
rest and this was the proximate cause of his falling asleep while driving
home.” Id. Since Van Devander, formal exceptions to the rule have evolved.
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the “special hazard”
exception provides for recovery for injuries outside the scope of employment,
if “there is a peculiar or abnormal exposure to a peril, whose risk is incident
to or inseparable from the scene of employment.” Snowbarger v. Tri-County
Electrical Cooperative, 793 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. 1990). In Snowbarger, the
employee worked eighty-six out of the 100.5 hours preceding the accident,
which the court found constituted exposure to an abnormal peril. Id. at 350.
Because the employee fell asleep at the wheel on the way home from work,
the court found that his physical exhaustion was attributable to the employer’s
working conditions. Id. The court stated that Snowbarger “encountered an
abnormal exposure to an employment related peril because he worked eightysix out of the 100.5 hours preceding his fatal accident; his physical exhaustion
engendered an unusual risk of an automobile accident . . . [t]he condition was
incident to his employment.” Id. Therefore, the fact “that the accident
happened after he had driven approximately twenty-two miles . . . [did] not
change its cause: the unusually long overtime hours he had worked.” Id.
Finally, Deland v. Hutchings Psychiatric Ctr. affirmed the decision of the
New York State Workers’ Compensation Board that falling asleep at the wheel
was connected to the extreme demands of employment. 203 A.D.2d 776
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994). The employee had worked twenty-eight out of forty
hours. Id. at 777. The court found that driving home after such an exhausting
schedule was a reasonably anticipated hazard. Id. It further found that the long
hours created the exhaustion which caused the accident. Id. Therefore, the
Deland court reasoned that the excessive number of hours worked in less than
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compensation law is whether an injury arises out of and in the
course of employment.128 An employee’s commute is generally
considered outside the scope of employment since the “hazards
[employees] encounter in such journeys are not incident to the
employer’s business.”129 However, the exception to the rule is
premised on recognizing the causal link between hazardous or
dangerous employment conditions and an automobile accident
that occurs during the trip home from work.130 As such, courts
have found that an employee’s car accident on the way home
from work is directly caused by employment fatigue and
sufficiently connected to employment to permit recovery.131 The
exception requires a finding that the employment conditions were
such that the risk of an accident of this kind was foreseeable.132 If
so, an injury occurring outside of or away from work is brought
back under the umbrella of workers’ compensation coverage
because the risk of such injury never left the workplace.133
When assessing the validity of a claim against a hospital by a
third-party injured by an exhausted employee leaving work, the
narrow “special hazard” exception of workers’ compensation law
provides an analogous causal nexus between a hospitalemployer
that overworks residents to the point of extreme fatigue and an
accident caused by a resident who fell asleep at the wheel. This
doctrine, customized for injuries sustained on a commute for the
purpose of workers’ compensation coverage, provides a
a two day period caused the accident. Id.
128
See Van Devander, 405 F.2d at 1110; Snowbarger, 793 S.W.2d at
349; Deland, 203 A.D.2d at 777.
129
Van Devander, 405 F.2d at 1110.
130
Id.
131
See, e.g., Van Devander, 405 F.2d at 1110; Snowbarger, 793 S.W.2d
at 350; Deland, 203 A.D.2d at 778.
132
See generally supra note 129 (setting forth case law illustrating this
exception).
133
Snowbarger v. Tri-County Electrical Cooperative, 793 S.W.2d 348,
350 (Mo. 1990) (stating that “[a] condition may also exist where there is a
peculiar or abnormal exposure to a peril, whose risk is incident to or
inseparable from the scene of employment . . . [the employee’s] physical
exhaustion engendered an unusual risk of an automobile accident”).
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theoretical basis of causation when exhausted residents cause
accidents after leaving work.
E. Putting it All Together
Case law indicates that a tiered analysis of duty and
causation, issues that seem to inevitably merge with one another
in intensely fact-driven cases, determines a finding of
negligence.134 Nonetheless, foreseeability of harm, or at least
foreseeability of a risk of harm, is a standard principle that both
issues share.135 “Duty is measured by the scope of the risk which
negligent conduct foreseeably entails.”136 On the other hand,
these cases all involved egregious circumstances, not the least of
which was an affirmative act on the part of the employer that
played a direct causal role in the harm suffered.137 The Otis
dissent instructively argued that because the employer did not
commit an affirmative act, it should not be held responsible for
harm that resulted.138 By relying on this distinguishable fact,
however, the dissent actually left itself open to placing liability
134

See supra Part III.A-D (discussing third-party liability).
Id.
136
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2 (1956).
137
See generally supra Part III.A-D (setting forth case law examining
third-party liability). Consider also that Texas courts have not extended the
Otis holding to find employer liability. See Nat’l Convenience Stores Inc. v.
Matherne, 987 S.W.2d 145, 151 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding that without
“evidence of actual or constructive knowledge [that the employee] was
incapacitated by fatigue . . . [the employer] could not have breached any duty
to prevent [the employee] from driving”); Moore v. Times Herald Printing
Co., 762 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding no evidence that the
employer had knowledge of the employee’s incapacity and did not act
affirmatively sufficient to control the employee’s actions); J & C Drilling Co.
v. Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tex. App. 1993) (concluding that the
employer did not take any affirmative action to place the employee on the road
in a fatigued state; in fact, the employer provided a trailer for rest at the work
site).
138
Otis Engineering v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 318 (Tex. App. 1983)
(McGee, J., dissenting) (noting that the employer did not intoxicate the
employee).
135
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on a hospital that does create the dangerous situation—namely,
working a resident to the point of exhaustion.139 The Otis
dissent’s reasoning leads to the conclusion that, when an
employer creates fatigue which causes an accident, liability
should or could be imposed.140
IV. ANALYSIS AND APPLICABILITY OF CASE LAW TO MEDICAL
RESIDENTS
An affirmative act of requiring an employee to work an
excessive number of hours may open the door to employer
liability.141 To establish a prima facie case of negligence, the
defendant must have breached a duty owed to the plaintiff.142
Although no hospital has been found liable for injuries sustained
by a motorist involved in an accident with a fatigued resident
who fell asleep at the wheel, the aforementioned case law
provides encouraging signs that a claim could succeed in the
context of medical residency programs.
A. A Hospital’s Duty to Schedule Residents with Reasonable
Care
A common thread in cases discussing an employer’s liability
to third parties is that if a risk or hazard arising out of
employment is reasonably foreseeable, a duty is triggered on the
part of the employer to prevent such a risk.143 As a general

139

Id. at 318.
Id.
141
See supra Part III (setting forth cases involving employer liability for
third parties).
142
See, e.g., Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 566 (W. Va.
1983). The court stated, “[i]n order to establish a prima facie case of
negligence . . . it must be shown that the defendant has been guilty of some
act or omission in violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff. No action for
negligence will lie without a duty broken.” Id. (citing Parsley v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 280 S.E.2d 703 (W. Va. 1981)).
143
See, e.g., Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 568. The Robertson court was
140
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proposition, if an employer affirmatively requires its employee to
work to the point of excessive fatigue, it becomes reasonably
foreseeable that the employee may fall asleep at the wheel after
work and cause an accident.144 Similarly, a hospital arguably
creates a duty to act with reasonable care when scheduling
residents beyond set limits because of the foreseeability that an
exhausted resident will cause an accident driving home from
work.145
Literature and studies by the medical community highlighting
the inherently dangerous nature of resident physician training and
employment methods as they pertain to operating an automobile
also put the hospitals on notice of this problem.146 This
information, if not produced by doctors and researchers actually
working at or with the hospital,147 is at least available to
employer-hospitals. Hospitals regularly schedule residents for an
excessive number of hours, despite medical evidence that
confronted with the question of whether the existence of a duty is the product
of foreseeability. Id. After examining the evidence, the court determined that
“the [employer] could have reasonably foreseen that its exhausted
employee . . . would pose an immediate risk of harm to other motorists.” Id.
See also Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 708 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
(stating that a defendant is “subject to the general duty to avoid conduct that
unreasonably creates a foreseeable risk of harm to a plaintiff”).
144
See supra Part III (discussing analogous case law).
145
See, e.g., Gear et al., supra note 2, at 2 (questioning anesthesiology
residents and finding a greater accident rate amongst residents than the
national average); Lyznicki et al., supra note 10 (assessing driver sleepiness
and highway crashes and reviewing recent recommendations to limit hours-ofservice regulations for commercial motor vehicle drivers); Marcus &
Laughlin, supra note 10 at 766 (concluding that “an increased incidence of
falling asleep at the wheel when driving home [after an on-call shift] probably
result[s] in increased traffic citations and motor vehicle accidents”).
146
See Gear et al., supra note 2; Lyznicki et al., supra note 10; Marcus
& Laughlin, supra note 10.
147
See Amended Complaint for Plaintiff, Brewster v. Hong, No. 98 L
008806 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 2002). The second count of the plaintiff’s complaint points
out, “Defendant [Hospital] operated its own Sleep Disorder and Research
Center” and generally argues that hospitals should be aware of the problems
associated with fatigue and motor vehicle accidents. Id.
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“residents are 6.7 times more likely to have a motor vehicle
accident due to falling asleep at the wheel during their residency
than before their residency.”148 Therefore, these scheduling
practices constitute an affirmative act triggering a duty to prevent
the risk of motor vehicle accidents.
In light of the hospital’s knowledge of resident fatigue and its
detrimental effect on driving a vehicle, in conjunction with
ever-expanding medical evidence, it is foreseeable that residents
will fall asleep at the wheel and pose a danger to the general
public.149 Not only is it foreseeable because overworked and
fatigued employees are at risk of falling asleep at the wheel and
causing accidents, but residents are especially prone to accidents
as a result of their difficult and irregular schedules that produce
irregular sleeping patterns.150 Since the hospital creates the
hazardous condition, they arguably owe a duty to those who are
at risk when a resident leaves the hospital after, for instance, a
thirty-six hour on-call shift.151
B. Culture of Resistance
There is pressure placed on residents to endure long hours
and stick by their patients, even if assigned to them towards the
end of a shift, based upon the prevailing notion that long work
hours breed good doctors.152 This culture is, for several reasons,
148

See Public Citizens Health Research Group et al., supra note 2, at 5.
See, e.g., Lyznicki et al., supra note 10.
150
See Veasey et al., supra note 13 (recognizing the impact of irregular
sleeping patterns experienced by medical residents).
151
Analogous case law is illustrative, see, e.g., Robertson v. LeMaster,
301 S.E. 2d 563, 570 (W. Va. 1983); Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703,
710 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
152
See Marcus & Loughlin, supra note 10, at 766. “Stated reasons
include maintaining continuity in patient care, instilling a sense of
responsibility in residents, and increasing the learning opportunities for
residents.” Id. See also Sarah Avery, Residents May Get Shorter Shift, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 22, 2002, at A1. According to Dr. John
Weinerth, Director of Graduate Medical Education at Duke University, “[i]f
you are only on for eight hours, is that enough time to follow a patient’s
149
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resistant to work hour reform for resident physicians.153
Residents, akin to the position of an apprentice, are dependent on
their supervisors for positive evaluations.154 Fatigue is perceived
illness through to some sort of conclusion? Some illnesses are quick; some
take a long time.” Id. This supports the school of thought that properly trained
doctors need to get the “hands-on experience of tending to patients through the
progression of an illness or injury.” Id. See also Sean McLinden, Editorial,
Education, Not Ego, is Behind Medical Residents’ Long Hours, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, June 29, 2002, at A10.
Learning, through observation, how a disease progresses is essential
to acquiring the skills necessary to accurately detect and manage that
disease in unsupervised settings. The [‘]index of suspicion,[’] the
most valuable tool available to the physician, is most sharply honed
through the process of caring for patients.
Id.
153
See Sandra G. Boodman, Waking up to the Problem of Fatigue Among
Medical Interns, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001 at S1. Residency work hours and
the training in general has not changed since its inception 100 years ago. Id.
Doctors maintain that the grueling schedules are necessary to train future
doctors, citing the need “to subordinate needs for sleep and food to the
unpredictable and often consuming demands of patient care.” Id. Surgeons
insist that long hours are conducive to quality patient care because they
“benefit patients by fostering a ‘community of care’ that forges a bond
between doctors and patients.” Id. One Harvard-trained surgeon stated,
“[s]urgeons are built differently. [Becoming impervious to exhaustion is] a
part of the selection process in surgery.” Id. He was also quoted as dismissing
complaints about fatigue as “whining.” Id.; see also David Abel, Bill Eyes
Guidelines on Work Hours for Medical Residents, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10,
2001 at B1. Many hospital administrators and doctors feel that the current
scheduling practices of residency training programs are designed to force
young doctors to make decisions under pressure. Id. Faverty briefly touched
on this type of environment that exists in the fast-food setting by rejecting the
employer’s assertion that the employee “volunteered” for the overnight
clean-up shift. Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 710 (Or. Ct. App.
1995). The court found that the employee did not merely volunteer for the
shifts, but rather, that the employer affirmatively asked him to work the shifts.
Id. The court rejected this “spin on the evidence” and recognized that the
employer controlled such duties and penalized employees for failing to fulfill
them. Id.
154
Boodman, supra note 153. “Residents are a captive population afraid
to complain—or to admit they are exhausted—because their careers depend on
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as a weakness in medicine and residency training programs.155
An Illinois case involving an allegation of negligence on the
part of the hospital for a car accident caused by a fatigued
resident provides a good example.156 According to the complaint,
the resident in question remained at the hospital from her thirtythird to thirty-seventh hours solely because she felt she “had to
stay longer than just [her] usual sign-out time.”157 Narrowly
classifying such actions as voluntary, thus constituting a separate
causal source, ignores the prevalent feeling amongst residents
that hospitals expect them to remain almost indefinitely at the
hospital to care adequately for their patients.158 While the hospital
in the Illinois case will likely argue that the resident voluntarily
remained at the hospital, the unreasonably high expectations
hospitals place on residents commonly create fatigue-related
motor vehicle crashes.159 Still, a court may disagree with
the goodwill of their supervisors, particularly their residency directors.” Id. A
resident’s future hinges on the recommendation received from his or her
senior physician. Id.
155
Id. See also Marc Siegel, Editorial, Commentary Training Rxzzzzz
Medical Residents Need Good Supervision, Not More Sleep, L.A. TIMES, July
1, 2002, at B11. According to Mr. Siegel, Assistant Professor of Medicine at
New York University:
[t]he age-old caste system for residency training is based on role
modeling and continuity of patient care, where fledgling interns learn
responsibility by doing rounds with their supervising residents and
following through with their patients. It is incorrect to assume that
sleep deprivation alone is what can lead to untoward patient
outcomes. The greater risk lies with poorly motivated residents who
lack adequate guidance.
Id.
156
See Brewster, supra note 147.
157
Id. (emphasis added).
158
See, e.g., Boodman, supra note 153. See also Carl T. Hall, Doctors
See Loopholes in the Limits on Workweek, S. F. CHRON., June 16, 2002, at
A4 (quoting a third-year resident at San Francisco General as saying, “[y]ou
don’t talk about it[.] If you complain, you would be perceived as not being
tough enough, or of being lazy, or not motivated to learn and do more and be
enthusiastic. It would be seen as having a bad attitude.”).
159
See supra Part I (discussing fatigue and residency training programs).
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Faverty’s acknowledgment that employees feel pressure from
management to complete shifts.160 Moreover, expectations felt by
residents may be difficult to document and prove in court.
On the other hand, residents are also aware of their fatigued
conditions. Indeed, the individual resident likely knows better
than any supervisor just how tired she feels and has the option of
resting at the hospital or calling a taxi service or family member
for transportation.161 Nonetheless, an independent decision to
drive home, if it is to be classified as such, does not change the
fact that hospitals schedule grueling hours.162 While a fatigued
resident is at least partly responsible for his or her decision to
drive, the hospital, as an employer, is responsible for placing the
resident in a position to make such a decision, let alone exercise
good judgment in a sleep-deprived condition.163 In the future, in
recognition of these circumstances, courts may be willing to view
the hospital and resident as joint tortfeasors and assign
responsibility to both parties.
160

Faverty v. McDonald’s, 892 P.2d 703, 710 (Or. App. 1995) (stating
that the employee “did not, out of the blue volunteer to take three shifts . . .
[d]efendant affirmatively asked him to work those hours”).
161
As a practical matter, whether a resident will arrange for
transportation every time he or she feels nervous about fatigue is debatable. It
is certainly possible that residents will ignore their exhausted bodies and drive
home simply because they have been in the hospital for thirty-six hours and
understandably want to get home.
162
See, e.g., Public Citizens Health Research Group et al., supra note 2;
see also Brewster, supra note 147. Still, an employer would seemingly have to
know more than that the general nature of residency training is exhausting.
Rather, a plaintiff would need to show that the employer knew of a specific
employee’s fatigue when they left work. While an industry awareness of
fatigue supports the conclusion that change, perhaps through legislation, is
necessary to alleviate the problem, imposing liability on employers for
employees who are fatigued in general likely pushes the concept of third-party
liability past its breaking point.
163
Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E. 2d 563, 570 (W. Va. 1983) (holding
that if the intervening cause, here, the fatigued resident, “is one to be
reasonably anticipated, the defendant may be liable, for ‘[t]he risk created by
the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of
others’ (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed.) (1971)).
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C. Third-Party Liability and Residency Training Programs

Imposing third-party liability upon hospital employers would
produce some favorable results, but also has dangerous
implications. On the one hand, tort liability can deter harmful
conduct—here, the excessive scheduling of resident physicians
that causes fatigue. On the other hand, imposing broad liability
on health care institutions can upset their ability to provide vital
services.
1. Arguments in Favor of Imposing Tort Liability on Hospitals
Tort liability is appropriate if it positively addresses and
deters harmful conduct.164 In the medical residency context, the
pertinent issue is whether finding a hospital liable to a motorist
struck by a resident during the trip home from work can solve the
fatigue-related problems of residency training.
The fundamental philosophical premise of compensation
supports such liability.165 If hospitals are immune from liability,
innocent motorists struck by fatigued residents are left to absorb
the cost of their injuries. Given the cost of medical education,
residents are an unlikely source for large damage awards.166
164

See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient
Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1993) (asserting that, in a strict
liability context, “[p]otential injurers forced to pay the full social costs of the
risks that they create face efficient incentives to reduce risk by caretaking and
decreasing activity frequency to the efficient levels”).
165
Indeed, the Robertson court briefly discussed the history and aims of
tort law before assessing the facts at hand. Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 610.
Desiring to promote the principle that victims of tortious conduct should be
compensated for their losses, Robertson recognized that contemporary courts
have abandoned the pro-defendant bias of the industrial revolution and
furthered “the modern trend to expand the concept of duty in tort cases.” Id.
166
For example, the average pay for residents at the University of New
Mexico Hospital is $35,000 to $36,000. See Jackie Jadrnak, Around the Clock
Work, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 22, 2002, at A1. In another example
illustrating the financial condition of residents during their training period, a
heart surgeon explained that after ten years of training, he accumulated
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Imposing liability on hospitals would compensate victims for the
harm suffered.
Furthermore, policy considerations suggest that imposing
liability on hospitals for the tortious acts of residents during their
commute is a wise choice. The basic formula in deciding whether
any act is negligent was initially laid down by Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.167 Articulating what
is essentially an equation of cost effectiveness, reflecting the
overall goal of American tort law, Hand stated that if the burden
of precaution in guarding against the risk of injury outweighs the
probability of harm together with the severity of the injury, it
simply is not negligent to allow the possibility of injury to
occur.168 Here, the likelihood of injury is high, as documented by
medical studies.169 The gravity of harm resulting from all
automobile accidents is obviously severe. Therefore, the question
is whether it is more cost effective for hospitals to allow these
inevitable accidents, or whether the tort regime should impose
liability on hospitals to deter them from their current employment
and resident training methods. Since a substantial portion of these
accidents are preventable and result in serious injury and loss of

$300,000 of debt resulting in $3,000 per month loan payments. See Liz
Kowalczyk, Heart Surgeons Suffer Long Hours, Less Pay, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 30, 2002, at A1.
167
159 F.2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947). A docked barge in New York harbor
broke away from its pier at a time when the employee responsible for the
vessel was inexcusably absent. Id. at 173-74. The barge set off a chain
reaction of damage to other vessels and property in the harbor, thus
implicating a potentially wide range of liability for the owner of the barge. Id.
at 170-71. The court formulated the cost-benefit analysis to account for the
unpredictable and inevitable nature of accidents, such as the “occasions when
every vessel will break from moorings.” Id. at 173.
168
Id.
169
See, e.g., Gear et al., supra note 2 (finding that anesthesiology
residents experience automobile accidents at a rate twice the national average);
Marcus & Loughlin, supra note 10 (finding that “residents frequently fall
asleep at the wheel when driving post-call”); Veasey et al., supra note 13
(stating that “the greatest documented danger of sleep loss for medical
residents is the risk of motor vehicle crashes”).
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life, the burden of precaution for the hospitals—adjusting their
scheduling for resident physician—is a worthy change. On the
other hand, the cost of such an adjustment, not to mention an
unpredictable third-party liability damage award, must also be
considered.170
2. Arguments Against Imposing Tort Liability on Hospitals
Imposing third-party liability on employers in general, and
hospitals in particular, also has negative implications.171 First,
there is the risk of expanding liability to employers in general to
an undesirable degree. Second, there is a risk of reduced quality
of care due to hospitals’ attempts to avoid liability. Finally,
hospitals subject to unpredictable tort judgments could disrupt
necessary community services.
The potential for unlimited liability represents a glaring
concern for imposing liability on the employer for injuries
occurring outside the place of employment.172 Under those
circumstances, the world becomes an employer’s plaintiff once
the nature or demands of a job become laborious to the degree of
170

See supra notes 42-43 (setting forth the financial implications hospitals
face when adjusting to work hour limits).
171
Hospitals, unlike the general employer population, provide a vital
service to their communities. As such, health care institutions regularly
receive different treatment in the eyes of the law. For example, Congress
amended the National Labor Relations Act with Health Care Amendments in
1974, implementing additional safeguards to prevent strikes and picketing that
could disturb patient care services. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2003). The amendments
mandate that a labor organization shall provide a health care institution not
less than a ten day notice before engaging in any strike, and any employee
who engages in a strike within the notice period shall lose his status as an
employee. Id.
172
See, e.g., Harrington v. Brooks Drugs, Inc., 808 A.2d 532 (N.H.
2002). Arising out of the workers’ compensation context, the court rejected
plaintiff’s argument that the commute after an overnight shift posed as a
hazard, thus constituting an exception to the “going and coming” rule. Id. at
536. The court was unprepared to “impose upon employers of overnight or
late shift employees liability greater than that borne by employers whose
employees work a more traditional nine-to-five schedule.” Id.
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posing a foreseeable risk of harm to others. Establishing an
appropriate point at which to draw such a line is difficult, if for
no other reason than that labor, whether repairing a derailed train
or providing patient care services, is exhausting or at least
taxing.173 Even in light of increasing volumes of medical and
scientific data pointing to exhausted resident physicians, it is a
precarious proposition to impose third-party liability on an
employer in any context, especially where the tortious act occurs
after and outside of employment.174
In the health care context, third-party liability could lead to a
reduction in health care services. Hospitals provide a necessary,
vital service to the public at large, including emergency care.175
Imposing third-party liability could cause a reduction in quality of
care by forcing a hospital to choose between providing
comprehensive patient care services around the clock and sending
residents home to ensure reasonable working hours.176
Public regulation seemingly strikes the best balance between
the needs of a hospital with those of the residents. Tying funding
to compliance, as in the proposed federal regulation, can more
effectively deter hospitals from inappropriate scheduling than the
penalty-driven New York regulations.177 Moreover, expensive
173

See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1004 (3d ed. 1992) (defining
labor as “physical or mental exertion, especially when difficult or exhausting;
work”).
174
Even the aforementioned cases that did approve of third-party liability
support this notion by virtue of their strict holdings and need for egregious
circumstances that give rise to employer knowledge of incapacity and
affirmative action. See supra Part III (examining analogous case law
permitting third-party liability).
175
Recognizing the emergency nature of hospital services and their
necessity to the community, the PPSPA provides that the work hour
limitations and requirements of the Act “shall not apply to a hospital during a
state of emergency.” H.R. 3236, supra note 4, at § 3 (j)(1)(C).
176
Even if a tort claim could successfully change residency programs to
the extent that they reduce work hours, less work hours for residents presents
financial challenges for the hospital as well. See supra notes 42-43 (discussing
the economic impact of limited work hours).
177
See supra Part II (examining the New York regulations and proposed
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lawsuits against hospitals could lead to increased medical costs,
shrunken patient care services or even bankruptcy of a health
care institution.178
CONCLUSION
The training of resident physicians in the United States
creates serious problems for patient care and the health of
residents. Public regulation, though limited in some respects,
demonstrates society’s desire to tackle this acknowledged
problem. Enforcement is a critical component for any type of
regulation. In this light, the PPSPA will likely operate more
effectively than the penalty driven Bell Regulations because its
enforcement mechanisms, conditioning federal funding and
providing financial incentives to conform, and provision of
additional payments from the federal government have more teeth
than the Bell Regulations.
In the alternative, the deterrent affect of tort law is a more
powerful method to affect change, at the cost of potential
financial burdens. That potential is compounded in light of the
unpredictable nature of tort liability on hospitals and employers
generally. Furthermore, case law illustrates the difficulty in
deciding what constitutes unreasonable scheduling or work hours,
an issue the Bell Regulations and PPSPA settle by implementing
work hour limits.179
Therefore, the PPSPA is a viable method to reduce work
hours for residency training because such a change will save
human life and promote medical and economic efficiency in the
form of healthy, proficient doctors. If it cannot, an unfortunate
motorist-turned-plaintiff may someday change the way medical
residents are trained.

federal legislation).
178
Even public regulation presents serious financial concerns for the
health care industry. See supra, note 43-44 (setting forth examples of hospitals
adjusting to work hour limits).
179
See generally H.R. 3236, supra note 4.

